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ABSTRACT 
 
Public health and rights-based approaches to abortion advocacy are well-established. 
Feminists are, however, increasingly using a broader framework of  ‘reproductive justice ?, 
which considers the intersecting ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƐĞƌǀĞƚŽĞŶŚĂŶĐĞŽƌŚŝŶĚĞƌǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
reproductive freedoms, including their capacities to decide about the outcome of their 
pregnancies. Nonetheless, reproductive justice approaches to abortion are, conceptually, 
relatively under-developed. We introduce a reparative justice approach as a method of 
further articulating the concept of reproductive justice. We first explain how this approach 
can be used to conceptualise safe, accessible, and supportive abortion as a key element of 
reproductive justice in relation to the injustice of unwanted or unsupportable pregnancies. 
Using ƌŶĞƐƚŽsĞƌĚĞũĂ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ of reparative justice and case studies of two countries 
(South Africa and Great Britain) where abortion is legal, we show how such an approach 
enables an analysis of reproductive justice within the specificities of particular contexts. We 
argue that both the rights-based legal framework adopted in South Africa and the 
medicalised approach of British law have, in practice, limited reparative justice in these 
contexts. We discuss the implications of reparative justice for abortion advocacy.  
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Public health and rights-based approaches have achieved significant successes in relation to 
the liberalisation of abortion legislation and the provision of abortion services in a number 
of countries across the globe (Hessini 2005).  Within a public health approach, safe abortion 
provision is positioned ĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ, in particular by reducing 
the morbidity and mortality associated with unsafe abortion.  In contrast, mainstream 
Western feminist advocacy, which has been taken up by gender networks in the global 
South (Hessini 2005), has typically hinged on a liberal rights-based approach in which self-
determination, choice and equality are foregrounded (Cook and Dickens 2003; Ferree 2003).   
There are, however, also several long-standing feminist critiques of the abortion 
rights approach, whether deployed on its own or in tandem with a public health argument. 
The liberal framing of abortion rights rests on an assumption of unfettered agency on the 
part of women seeking abortions (Petchesky 1986) and fails to consider the gendered, raced 
and classed social conditions that, firstly, lead to unwanted or unsupportable pregnancies 
(Smyth 2002) ?ĂŶĚƐĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ ‘ĐŚŽŽƐĞ ? 
(Fried 2006).   
In light of such critiques, various authors ŚĂǀĞĂƌŐƵĞĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ
jƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞƐĂŶĚŐŽĞƐďĞǇŽŶĚĂ ‘ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƌŝŐŚƚƐ ? approach. Drawing on a 
social justice framework, a reproductive justice approach emphasises systemic or holistic 
analyses, seeking to illuminate the complex array of social, economic, cultural and 
healthcare possibilities and challenges that serve to either enhance or hinder women ?Ɛ
reproductive freedoms (Gilliam, Neustadt, and Gordon 2009).  The SisterSong Women of 
Color Reproductive Health collective in the USA has been credited with coining the term 
(Bailey 2011), and women of colour have been central in highlighting the marginalisation of 
intersecting dimensions - such as race and class - within feminist discourse concerning 
abortion rights (Fried 2006). Activists have drawn attention to the disproportionate 
difficulties that can prevent ǁŽŵĞŶůŝǀŝŶŐŝŶƉŽǀĞƌƚǇĨƌŽŵĞǆĞƌĐŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ƚŽƐĂĨĞ
abortion, as well as the ways in which eugenicist State policies construct particular, 
racialised, ďŽĚŝĞƐĂƐƵŶĨŝƚƚŽƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƚŽcontinue a pregnancy and 
parent a child a reality for only certain groups of women (Ross 2006).  Reproductive justice 
expands a rights-based discourse to address the social reality of inequality, specifically, the 
inequality of opportunity in controlling reproductive destiny. Reproductive issues are seen 
ĂƐŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚǁŝƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ǁĞůĨĂƌĞƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ŚŽƵƐŝŶŐ ?ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?
environmental justice, immigration policy, drug policies, violence, work and family (Bailey 
2011). Through this framework, abortion is re-positioned as one important element of a 
much broader social project. 
 In this paper, we suggest that, although a reproductive justice approach adds crucial 
elements that are lacking from public health and rights-based discourses on abortion, it 
requires further articulation. In particular, there is a need to consider precisely how 
particular legislative and social contexts may facilitate or impede reproductive justice in 
relation to the specific injustices of an unwanted or unsupportable pregnancy. We introduce 
a reparative justice approach as a framework for conducting such analyses and illustrate its 
utility by applying it to case studies of two countries  W South Africa and Great Britain (i.e. 
England, Scotland and Wales)1  W with different regulatory frameworks for legal abortion 
provision.  
                                                          
1 We use the term Great Britain deliberately, to distinguish our case study from the UK. In doing so, we 
acknowledge the very different and restrictive legal framework in Northern Ireland, where abortion is 
criminalised except in a very narrow range of circumstances. 
 Developing a reproductive justice framework for abortion: introducing the concept of 
reparative justice 
 
Reparative justice is associated with restitution or recompense for an injustice: when a 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŽƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞ ĞƐƚƐare harmed, then this injustice 
needs to be remedied (Thompson 2002). It has been invoked in a range of contexts, 
including criminal justice, historical injustices (slavery and colonialism), and post-conflict 
situations. While it often refers to reparative obligations in the case of a crime, obligations 
to make reparation need not imply criminal liability (Kelly 2011).  
As Walker highlights, reparative justice is distinctive in centring on harmed 
individuals (or groups) and focusing on the provision of  ‘direcƚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĂŶĚƌĞůŝĞĨƚŽǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ? 
(Walker, 2016, 14). A key advantage of this framework as a basis for theorising justice in 
relation to unwanted and unsupportable pregnancies is that it foregrounds the needs of 
individual women, and the concrete ways in which these might be addressed.   
Petchesky (1986) theorises abortion as essential to ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ
on the basis of ŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚ ‘ƐŽĐŝĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů/bodily ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐǇ ?Although 
she does not draw on a reparative justice framework, it is possible to mobilise her analysis 
to conceptualise unwanted or unsupportable pregnancies in terms of gendered injustices, 
which require particular forms of reparation. First, social injustices generate many 
unwanted pregnancies and/or render them unsupportable (for example, gendered 
inequalities in relation to contraception and childcare, unsupportive working environments, 
racialised inequalities in State support for child-rearing).  Second, a lack of social/material 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽend an unwanted or unsupportable pregnancy represents 
an injustice in terms of her bodily integrity. This is central to what it means to be a person 
(in many, albeit not all, societies), i.e. bodily integrity unĚĞƌƉŝŶƐ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨǁŽŵĞŶĂƐ
ŵŽƌĂůĂŐĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůďĞŝŶŐƐ ?(Petchesky, 1986, 388).  These social and bodily injustices 
require a range of forms of social repair, including transforming the unequal social 
conditions within which reproduction takes place, and the provision of safe, accessible, and 
supportive abortion.  
Petchesky (1986) argues that the social and individual/bodily aspects of pregnancy 
cannot be separated. She cautions against feminist discourse which treats abortion as a 
 ‘ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ?that might disappear if social conditions were transformed, noting the way in 
ǁŚŝĐŚƚŚŝƐĚĞŶŝĞƐ ‘ƚŚĞůĞǀĞůŽĨƌĞĂůŝƚǇŵŽƐƚŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞĨŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŽŵĞŶ PƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŚĞŝƌ
ďŽĚŝĞƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐŝĞƐŽĐĐƵƌ ? (Petchesky, 1986, 13). This position has resonances with 
tĂůŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ?2016) critique of  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐĞ, which emphasise 
large-scale structural change and neglect the concrete reparations which can address the 
harms that individual women experience.  Similarly, in conceptualising reparative justice in 
relation to unwanted/unsupportable pregnancy, we emphasise the need to challenge the 
unjust social circumstances of reproduction while insisting that safe, legal and supportive 
abortion is an always necessary  W if insufficient  W repair for the harm that an unwanted or 
unsupportable pregnancy represents to the individual woman. In the analysis that follows 
we explain how a reparative justice framework can be used to illuminate the extent to 
which this form of repair is achieved in different country contexts.  
It is important to acknowledge concerns about a conceptual framework that 
positions women seeking abortion as (potential) victims of injustice. Feminist theorists have 
long critiqueĚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ǀŝĐƚŝŵ-ďĂƐĞĚ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇƐŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ
pregnant women as vulnerable, unreliable reproductive decision-makers (Lee 2003; Boyle, 
1997; Sheldon 1997). Groups opposed to abortion have repeatedly capitalised on 
constructions of women as lacking agency in order to argue for restrictions on the provision 
ŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞŝŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ ‘ďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?However, reparative justice  ‘does not aim at 
restoring a deficient status, but rather at affirming the equal dignity and rights of those who 
have previously been denied this status ? (Walker, 2016, 10). In other words, as a process, it 
is about recognising those who are harmed as persons, with agency, to whom society has an 
obligation to make just repairs. Within this framework it remains possible to conceptualise 
abortion in positive terms ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ĂƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ ‘ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĂŶĚƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞĨƵůŶĞƐƐŝŶƚŚĞ
face of unwanted pregnancǇ ? ?ŽǇůe, 1997,  ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐĂŶ ‘enabling condition for full human 
participatŝŽŶŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶĂůůŝĨĞ ? (Petchesky, 1986, 378). 
 
A critical theory of reparative justice 
 
As with all abstract constructs, there is considerable debate about how ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?
should be theorised and applied (Isaacs and Vernon, 2011). In this paper, in keeping with 
ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐĞĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞƐ ?concerns to contextualise the possibilities of subjectivity, we 
ĚƌĂǁŽŶƌŶĞƐƚŽsĞƌĚĞũĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞũƵƐƚŝĐe because this moves 
beyond a liberal, rights-based approach to reparations. 
Verdeja's (2008) framework for understanding the goals of reparation, drawing on 
EĂŶĐǇ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ(2003) ŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ƐƚĂƚƵƐƉĂƌŝƚǇ ? ?ƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞneed for reparation around 
material/objective conditions and symbolic/subjective, identity-based conditions. Verdeja 
further differentiates between individual and collective reparations. The combination of 
types of reparation and the recipients of reparation allows for four reparative dimensions: 
individual material, collective material, individual symbolic and collective symbolic, each of 
which will be discussed below in relation to abortion. As with all such frameworks, the 
distinctions made are heuristic or, as Verdeja acŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ ? “ŝĚĞĂů-ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ? ?208); in 
practice, the four are intertwined in complex ways.   
Reparation within the individual material dimension provides individuals with 
greater auƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ “individual rehabilitation through access to medical, 
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ? ?Verdeja 2008, 215). In relation to abortion, we 
conceptualise this as the facilitation of autonomous decision-making regarding the outcome 
of a pregnancy via legislative enablement and a commitment to supportive healthcare 
provision. In analysing country case studies in relation to this dimension, then, we can ask: 
to what extent do legal and healthcare policies facilŝƚĂƚĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƵƚonomous decision-
making in a particular setting?  
The collective material dŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨsĞƌĚĞũĂ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ?215) framework refers to the 
proǀŝƐŝŽŶŽĨ “ƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐƚŽǀŝĐƚŝŵŝƐed groups as a way of obtaining the material basis and 
security requireĚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĨƵůůǇŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐůŝĨĞ ? ?It means 
 “ƚŚĞƌĞĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ?sĞƌĚĞũĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?215) so as to ensure those 
affected are able to access the resources they need. In relation to abortion we can thus ask 
about the extent to which the provision of legal state-sponsored healthcare resources make 
abortion both accessible and safe for all women.  
The collective symbolic dimension of reparative justice implies highlighting 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƐ ?ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐŝŶŐǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?experiences of these repressions, condemning narratives 
that legitimate the repression and that place responsibility for suffering on the victim 
(Verdeja, 2008). In relation to abortion, this speaks to paying attention to public discourses 
about, and social attitudes towards, abortion, and the ways in which they constitute 
available subject positions for women who decide to end their pregnancies.  
The individual symbolic dimension focuses on recognising those suffering from 
injustices as individuals rather than reducing them to  “amorphous collective identities ? and 
includes paying attention to how injustice ĂĨĨĞĐƚƐ “individuals as individuals ? (Verdeja, 2008, 
214). In relation to abortion, the individual symbolic dimension highlights the importance of 
understanding individual lived experiences of unwanted and unsupportable pregnancies and 
of abortion within the social and structural dynamics of particular contexts.  
 
Reparative justice and abortion in context: case studies of South Africa and Britain 
 
In the rest of this paper, we illustrate how the four dimensions of VerdeũĂ ?Ɛ critical theory of 
reparative justice may be used to explore how reproductive justice is furthered or 
hampered in complex ways in different contexts. We have chosen South Africa and Great 
Britain as exemplars as they provide an interesting juxtaposition in terms of legislation and 
access to abortion. We have purposefully not concentrated on contexts (such as Northern 
Ireland) where abortion legislation is very restrictive. In these cases, the application of 
reparative justice is relatively clear:  the initial  ‘ƌĞƉĂŝƌ ? required is the liberalisation of 
abortion legislation. We wanted, instead, to explore the framework in spaces where more 
nuanced work is required.  
 Our starting point is a key element of the legislation governing abortion in the two 
countries, viz. the locus of decision-making. In South Africa, women may request an 
abortion up to 12 weeks of gestation. For this period, the locus of decision-making (at least 
legally) rests with the woman. In contrast, in Great Britain, the locus of decision-making 
rests with doctors who have to recommend an abortion on various grounds. At first glance, 
then, it appears that reproductive justice is better served in South Africa than it is in Britain: 
women are legally provided with the  ‘ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌĞŐŶĂŶĐŝĞƐ. 
Nevertheless, as our analysis below shows, when the lenses afforded by the reparative 
justice perspective suggested by Verdeja (2008) are systematically applied across the two 
countries, a more complex picture emerges. dŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉĂŝƌ ?ŽĨƐĂĨĞ ? accessible and supportive 
abortion is hindered and facilitated in these two contexts in uneven ways and we suggest 
that reproductive justice is not fully served in either setting.  
Our analysis is, necessarily, restricted by the research that is available.  In the 
sections that follow we draw on existing empirical and conceptual work concerning abortion 
in South Africa and Great Britain to provide an analysis of the key dimensions of reparation 
in each country. 
 
Abortion in South Africa: A Case Study of Reparative Justice 
 
Individual Material Dimension: Structural Facilitation of Autonomous Decision-making 
 
The Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act (Act No. 92 of 1996) as amended in the Choice 
on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act (Act No. 1 of 2008) (henceforth CTOP Act) 
replaced the restrictive Abortion and Sterilisation Act  (Act No. 2 of 1975) that was 
promulgated during Apartheid. The CTOP Act, at least on paper, is strong on the individual 
material dimension of reparative justice as it recognises women as autonomous decision-
makers, who may request a termination of pregnancy within the first trimester of 
pregnancy. This stipulation is premised on a clear human rights basis in the Act, extending to 
ĞǀĞƌǇǁŽŵĂŶ “ƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶĞĂƌůǇ ?ƐĂĨĞĂŶĚůegal termination of 
pregnancy ? ?dKWWƌĞĂŵďůĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 1).  
The locus of decision-making shifts to the health service provider from the second 
trimester, with medical doctors making the decision based on the woman's mental or 
physical health, risk of physical or mental foetal abnormalities, rape or incest, and the social 
and economic status of the woman. Thus, the autonomy of decision-making accorded to the 
woman is circumscribed by gestation date. 
The CTOP Act requires the state to promote the provision of non-mandatory and 
non-directive counselling before and after a termination of pregnancy. This provision seems 
to constitute pregnant women as autonomous decision-makers. However, Vincent (2012, 
 ? ? ? ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐŽƵŶƐĞůůŝŶŐĐĂŶ “ĞĂƐŝůǇďĞĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂďŽƵƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƚŚĞŝƌďŽĚŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƐĞǆƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĐŚŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ?ƐŚĞ
points out, of such normative counselling is to create a hierarchy of deserving candidates for 
abortion: differentiating appropriate and acceptable reasons for requesting abortion from 
inappropriate and unacceptable ones.  
Indeed, research indicates that, in spite of the CTOP Act, women are often not, in 
practice, treated as autonomous abortion decision makers within general healthcare 
services.  Staff at referral centres have been shown to put obstacles in the way of women 
seeking services, invoking metaphors of killing and making religious references (Harries et al. 
2007). In addition, women living with HIV, in a country with a high incidence and prevalence 
of HIV, report being actively dissuaded from accessing abortions (de Bruyn 2006). 
 
Collective Material Dimension: Provision of Resources 
 
In the CTOP Act (1996, 1) ŝƚŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞŚĂƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
reproductive health to all, and also to provide safe conditions under which the right of 
choice can be exercised ? ?hƉƚŽ ? ?ǁĞĞŬƐŽĨŐĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚƌĂŝŶĞĚŵŝĚǁŝǀĞƐĐĂŶƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƚhe 
service and abortion can be performed at primary health facilities. An amendment to the 
Act (Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act, 2008 (Act No. 1 of 2008)) allowed 
any health facility with a 24-hour maternity service to offer first trimester abortion services 
without the ministerial permission that was previously required. The Act and its 
Amendment thus, on paper at least, specify that the State needs to make available the 
resources implicit in the collective material dimension of reparative justice. 
The initial expansion of services in South Africa post the passing of the CTOP Act was 
achieved through the distribution of low cost technology and through training of personnel 
through the National Abortion Care Programme (NACP) (Benson, Andersen, and Samandari 
2011). This had immediate positive effects, with a decrease in the incidence of unsafe 
abortions (Berer 2004), as well as lower rates of maternal morbidity and mortality as a 
result of incomplete abortion, particularly amongst young women (Jewkes Rees, Dickson, 
Brown, and Levin, 2005).  
Nevertheless, many women still procure abortions outside of designated clinics, 
consulting traditional healers (Jewkes, Gumede, Westaway, Dickson, Brown and Rees, 2005) 
and health professionals performing abortions without licence (Moodley and Akinsooto 
2003) or using a readily available herbal infusion (Constant et al. 2014). Advertisements for 
illegal abortion services abound in taxi ranks and city centres. Women presenting with 
incomplete abortions, having procured an abortion outside of the designated facilities, cite 
lack of knowledge of their rights under the CTOP Act, or lack of information about a local 
facility as reasons for approaching an illegal service provider (Jewkes et al. 2005; Moodley 
and Akinsooto 2003). More broadly, there is a lack of knowledge in the general population 
concerning the legal status of abortion (Macleod, Seutlwadi, and Steele 2014; Morroni, 
Myer, and Tibazarwa 2006).  
A major barrier to women accessing safe abortion in South Africa is that service 
provision is often extremely limited. Research shows that a significant number of women do 
not receive the abortion care that they requested (Gerdts et al. 2014). There are frequently 
delays in the delivery of services and long queues at facilities (Trueman and Magwentshu 
2013). Only just over half of the designated clinics are functional (Bateman 2011), and fewer 
than one third of trained health service providers actually provide the service (Trueman and 
Magwentshu 2013). Services in functioning facilities are fragmented according to the 
willingness of the health service providers to be involved in the various aspects of abortion 
care (Harries, Stinson, and Orner 2009). Many health service providers and facility managers 
cite personal objections to abortion on the grounds of conscience (Trueman and 
Magwentshu 2013). Nurses who do volunteer report, stigmatisation, victimisation and 
intimidation in the communities where they live (Potgieter 2004; Sibuyi, 2004). Facility, 
departmental and government officials are viewed as lacking the political will to implement 
the CTOP Act (Trueman and Magwentshu 2013). 
Provision of abortion services in South Africa is uneven across socio-economic status 
and location. Poor women and women in rural areas are more likely to die from abortion 
related complications than their counterparts (Orner et al. 2011). Notably, women in urban 
centres and wealthier women can access services through private providers (in particular 
Marie Stopes). Indeed, it has been argued that poor women are no better off in terms of 
abortion service provision than they were before the CTOP Act (Trueman and Magwentshu 
2013).   
 
Collective Symbolic Dimension: Public Discourses and Attitudes 
 
There is a reasonably strong anti-abortion lobby in South Africa. Three legal challenges have 
been mounted against the CTOP Act or portions thereof by religious pro-life organisations. 
This is counterbalanced by the ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ
provision of accessible and safe abortion and the de-stigmatisation of abortion (Trueman 
and Magwentshu 2013). 
Overall public support for abortion in South Africa is reportedly low, with few people 
approving of abortion on request or for social and economic reasons. There is, however, 
some support for abortion in the case of rape, incest and danger to womeŶ ?ƐŚĞĂůƚŚ
(Harrison et al. 2000). A survey amongst university students found that women students had 
more positive attitudes to the autonomy of women in abortion decision-making and in 
making abortion accessible than male students (Patel and Kooverjee 2009).  
The gendered aspect of public talk about abortion has been highlighted in a number 
of studies. Feltham-King and Macleod (2015), for example, show how the bifurcated 
positions (pro-choice versus pro-life) stated in the South African newsprint media (1978 to 
2005) about abortion were distinctly gendered, with the majority of female commentators 
consistently taking a pro-choice position, and male commentators taking a neutral/unstated 
position or a pro-life position.  Macleod and Hansjee (2013) show how men may deploy 
discourses of equality, support and rights (e.g. paternal rights) to subtly undermine women's 
reproductive right to 'choose' an abortion.   
 
Individual Symbolic Dimension: Individual Narratives in Context 
 
To our knowledge, no research in South Africa has focussed specifically on ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
experiences of unwanted and unsupportable pregnancies and the circumstances 
surrounding them. Studies on experiences of abortion in relation to public attitudes and 
discourses have mostly concentrated on young women, with findings showing that young 
women struggle to trust anybody in relation to abortion, feel that their decision was judged, 
indicate that attitudes to abortion enforce secrecy (de Lange and Geldenhuys 2001), and 
experience shame, embarrassment, guilt and sadness (Mojapelo-Batka and Schoeman 
2003). The interpellation of pro-life religious framingƐŽĨĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
deciding upon and undergoing an abortion in South Africa is highlighted in Harries et al. 
(2007), where women reported knowing that abortion is a legal right in South Africa, but 
questioned ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ŽŶƌeligious grounds. In the same study, women reported 
fears of being ostracised from their communities, which often led to them seeking care 
outside of their residential area. This stigma is exacerbated when the women are also HIV+ 
(Orner et al. 2011).  
  
Abortion in Great Britain: A Case Study of Reparative Justice 
 
Individual Material Dimension: Structural Facilitation of Autonomous Decision-making 
 
In contrast with the South African CTOP Act, the framework that regulates abortion in Great 
Britain does not recognise women as abortion decision-makers at any gestation of 
pregnancy. Abortion is a crime under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 in England 
and Wales, and a common law offence in Scotland (Sheldon, 2016). However, the Abortion 
Act 1967, as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, (henceforth 
referred ƚŽĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞďŽƌƚŝŽŶĐƚ ? ?makes abortion in Great Britain legal if two medical 
doctors are of the opinion that it is necessary on one of several grounds. These concern the 
risks of continuing the pregnancy for the health of the pregnant woman, or the future 
health of her foetus.  
The medicalised framework of the Abortion Act reflects the historical context in 
which it was produced. Parliamentary support for legal medical grounds for abortion in the 
1960s primarily reflected concerns about female morbidity and mortality caused by unsafe 
illegal abortion. The Abortion Act aimed explicitly to address this (Sheldon 2016). Although 
feminist scholarship remains critical of the ůĂǁ ?ƐƉĂƚĞrnalism (Boyle 1997; Sheldon 1997; 
Jackson 2001; Lee 2003, 2004; Sheldon 2016), it is broadly agreed that the Abortion Act has 
facilitated liberal abortion practice in Great Britain. A doctor can agree in good faith that any 
abortion requested by a pregnant woman is necessary, because (when performed in safe 
settings) abortion is always statistically less risky than continuing a pregnancy to term 
(Sheldon 2016). Moreover, contemporary abortion counselling policy and practice position 
women as competent, autonomous decision-makers who require support, but not guidance, 
regarding their decisions to end their pregnancies (Lee 2003). Lee (2004) argues that, in 
addition to the norms of medical practice increasingly prioritising patient autonomy, 
abortion practice has evolved on the basis of experience, namely, that women make their 
own decisions about abortion prior to contact with healthcare services.  
Nonetheless, research also illustrates that women continue to experience 
judgemental encounters with some health professionals (Astbury-Ward, Parry and Carnwell 
2012; Kumar et al. 2004; Lee 2004). Moreover, while health professionals typically describe 
ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶĂƐĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ďĞůŽŶŐƐ ?to pregnant women (Beynon-Jones 2012; Lee 2003), a 
study of professional accounts of abortion practice in Scotland illustrates that particular 
requests for abortion (for examplĞ ?ƚŚŽƐĞƚŚĂƚĂƌĞ ‘ůĂƚĞ ?Žƌ ‘ƌĞ-occurring ?, or which are made 
by women who fit normative ideals of motherhood) are routinely positioned as problematic 
and in need of regulation through forms of professional intervention (Beynon-Jones 2012, 
2013a, 2013b).  Collectively, this body of research indicates that women are unevenly 
constructed as legitimate reproductive decision-makers by health professionals. 
 
Collective Material Dimension: Provision of Resources 
 
In the introduction to its current Clinical Guideline on The Care of Women Requesting 
Induced Abortion, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG)  W the body 
that regulates training within this medical specialty in Great Britain  W locates abortion 
provision as part of the professional responsibility of gynaecologists. It also identifies 
abortion firmly ĂƐĂ ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞŶĞĞĚ ? which the State has an obligation to address (Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, 2011, 1). Resonating with this framing of 
abortion, the National Health Service (NHS) funds the vast majority of procedures 
performed on women resident in England, Scotland and Wales (e.g. 98 per cent of abortions 
in England and Wales were funded by the NHS in 2014 (Department of Health 2015)). In 
stark contrast to South Africa, then, ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶŝƐƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ ‘ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚĂƐĂŶŽƌŵĂůƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ƌŽƵƚŝŶĞŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞ ? ?Sheldon, 2016, 344) in Great Britain.  
However, the RCOG Clinical Guideline suggests problems with NHS Commissioning in 
ƐŽŵĞĂƌĞĂƐŵĞĂŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ĂĐĐĞƐƐƚŽďŽƚŚĞarly and late abortion services varies significantly 
ĂĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇĂŶĚƐŽŵĞǁŽŵĞŶĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĨĂĐĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ? ?Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2011, 28 - for additional evidence of uneven access see 
Lee et. al. 2004; Heller, et al. 2016; Purcell et al. 2014). Additionally, although the RCOG 
frames abortion as a positive  ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚĐĂƌĞŶĞĞĚ ?, this status has long been contested within 
both Parliament and the British medical profession (Boyle 1997; Davis & Davidson, 2006; 
Sheldon, 1997). Following the 1967 Abortion Act, major inequalities in abortion provision in 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĂƌĞĂƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁĞƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĚďǇE,^ĚŽĐƚŽƌƐ ?ŽďũĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ ?
which led to the establishment of independent sector providers in England and Wales 
(Abortion Law Reform Association 1997). In recent decades, the NHS has increasingly 
commissioned abortion services from (non-profit making) independent sector providers 
(these accounted for 67% of NHS-funded abortions performed on women resident in 
England and Wales in 2014  W Department of Health 2015). This has implications for the 
sustainability of abortion services because, as the number of abortions performed in the 
independent sector increases,  ‘the opportunities for training in NHS facilities decrease ?
(Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 2011, 27). 
 
Collective Symbolic Dimension: Public Discourses and Attitudes 
 
Feminist scholarship has long highlighted the problematic symbolic repercussions of the 
Abortion Act. Drawing on this literature, it is possible to identify two key ways in which the 
collective symbolic dimension of reparative justice in relation to unwanted/unsupportable 
pregnancy is hindered in contemporary Great Britain.  
Although the construction of abortion as a public health issue played a key role in 
the passing of the Abortion Act, the ůĂǁ ?Ɛdepiction of abortion as a medical matter 
continues to limit opportunities to acknowledge unwanted/unsupportable pregnancy as an 
issue of gendered injustice (Sheldon, 1997). In the decades following the Abortion Act, 
opponents of abortion have repeatedly capitalised on the authority granted to medical 
knowledge claims within public discourse about abortion in Great Britain. Specifically, they 
have used medical arguments to construct the foetus as an independent person, and to 
claim that women are physically and emotionally damaged by ending their pregnancies 
(Amery, 2014; Hopkins, Reicher and Saleem,1996; Hopkins, Zeedyk and Raitt, 2005). 
Operating within the confines of a medicalised legal discourse on abortion, supporters of 
the procedure typically counter these challenges with alternative medical knowledge claims, 
reproducing the dominant medicalised framing of abortion and further marginalising 
discussion of gender inequalities (Amery, 2014; Science and Technology Subgroup 1991; 
Sheldon 1997). 
As well as silencing questions of reproductive justice, the Abortion Act positions 
women as unreliable reproductive decision-makers (Boyle 1997; Sheldon 1997).  It also 
stigmatises women who seek to end their pregnancies by insisting that women need health 
grounds to render abortion a non-criminal act (Sheldon 2016). Contemporary media 
representations likewise depict abortion as a controversial and deviant course of action that 
requires special justification (Purcell, Hilton and McDaid (2014).  
However, as Purcell, Hilton and McDaid (2014) point out, negative media depictions 
contrast sharply with regular British public attitudinal surveys (see also Sheldon 2016), 
which show majority support for women being able to terminate a pregnancy without 
interference from the government (Ipsos MORI 2011). This indicates that, in spite of its 
narrow framing in Parliament and the media, the discursive framing of abortion as an issue 
ŽĨǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛautonomy is routinely available within British society.  
 
Individual Symbolic Dimension: Individual Narratives in Context 
 
Research ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛexperiences of abortion in Great Britain demonstrates that, 
although women often report feeling supported through their interactions with health 
professionals and services, some also describe feeling judged (Astbury-Ward et al. 2012; 
Kumar et al. 2004; Lee 2004; Purcell et al. 2014). Lattimer (1998) suggests that, far from 
being able to articulate the meaning of unwanted/unsupportable pregnancies in the 
contexts of their own lives, women negotiate their identities during healthcare encounters 
in relation to dominant discourses concerning motherhood and abortion. More recently, 
Astbury-Ward et al. (2012) highlight how concerns about stigma ůŝŵŝƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ
share their experiences beyond the context of the clinic, leaving them unable to seek help 
and support. Collectively this research suggests that, while an  ‘ĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶƌŝŐŚƚƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ 
may be available in Great Britain, ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĂďŽƌƚŝŽŶ are nonetheless shaped 
by stigmatising narratives of its meaning. 
  
Conclusion 
 Reproductive justice extends public health and rights-based approaches to abortion 
advocacy by emphasising the ŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚŝĐŚǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ 
reproductive actions in the world are delimited. However, despite the potential of a 
reproductive justice approach, we have argued that it lacks specificity as a means of 
addressing the particular, gendered injustices of unwanted or unsupportable pregnancies. In 
contrast, a reparative justice framework, which foregrounds the individuals harmed by 
ŝŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ƉŽŝŶƚƐƚŽƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌĨŽƌŵƐŽĨ ‘ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
unwanted/unsupportable pregnancies and provides a means to assess whether these are 
accomplished in practice.  
 Two key forms of repair are required: Transformation of the social conditions which 
generate unwanted pregnancies and render them unsupportable and the provision of social 
and material support for women to end pregnancies which they do not want, or decide that 
they are unable to, continue. In recognition of its significance to individual women who are 
pregnant, but who do not want to be, our analysis has focussed on the latter form of repair. 
Using two countries with contrasting legislative frameworks we have illustrated how 
VerdeũĂ ?Ɛ (2008) critical theory of reparative justice can be employed to analyse the extent 
to which the  provision of legal, safe, accessible and supportive abortion as a form of repair 
is hindered or facilitated in particular social contexts.  
Abortion is legally available in both South Africa and Great Britain, although the legal 
locus of decision-making differs, with South African law recognising women as autonomous 
decision-makers up to 12 weeks of gestation and British law delegating decision-making to 
medical doctors. While, on paper, reproductive justice appears to be better served in South 
Africa than in Great Britain, our application of the reparative justice framework indicates 
that the situation is substantially more complex than this initial gloss suggests. A multi-
dimensional analysis reveals that reproductive justice is served neither in South Africa, with 
its rights-based legal framework, nor in Great Britain with its public health approach to legal 
abortion.  
In South Africa, although women are legally positioned as autonomous decision-
makers within the first trimester of pregnancy, this is frequently undermined through 
differentiation in abortion counselling regarding deserving and non-deserving cases, and 
significant barriers to access. While the state is legally required to make resources available, 
in reality service provision is severely hampered, and access is uneven across ǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
socio-economic status and location. Moreover, there is substantial opposition to abortion in 
South Africa, in relation to which women who end their pregnancies experience stigma, 
shame and the need for secrecy. 
In contrast, in Great Britain, abortion provision is framed as a healthcare need, is 
funded by the NHS, and is widely available despite some variation across the country and at 
later gestations of pregnancy. Moreover, research suggests that women are typically 
treated as decision-makers in practice, and survey respondents generally agree that women 
should have decision-making power over the outcome of a pregnancy. However, the legal 
framing of abortion as a decision that belongs to the medical profession creates ongoing 
ĂŵďŝŐƵŝƚŝĞƐĂďŽƵƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?Perhaps more significantly, it shapes 
the symbolic terrain of public discourse on abortion in Great Britain (Sheldon 2016) in ways 
that both limit the articulation of abortion as a gender justice issue and reinforce negative 
positionings of women who decide to end their pregnancies.  
It is important to acknowledge the recursive relations between different dimensions 
of reparative justice, as Verdeja (2008) does. In particular, public discourses concerning the 
meaning of abortion (collective symbolic dimension) have implications for how service 
providers are viewed both by themselves and by others. Research suggests (Gallagher, 
Porock and Edgley 2010; O'Donnell, Weitz and Freedman 2011) that this will impact both 
the individual material dimension (the extent to which providers position women as 
legitimate decision-makers) and the collective material dimension (availability of provision) 
of reparative justice. In addition, reparative justice regarding abortion is deeply entwined 
with other health justice issues, including the general functioning of the healthcare system. 
While Great ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů,ĞĂůƚŚ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞŝƐǁĞůůĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?^ŽƵƚŚĨƌŝĐĂ ?ƐƉƵďůŝĐŚĞĂůƚŚ
sector faces a number of challenges. 
Applying reparative justice advocacy to South Africa implies, firstly, working with 
health service systems and providers to ensure supportive provision and that safe abortion 
is accessible to all women, and, secondly, undermining social processes that foster public 
negativity regarding abortion while supporting those that affirm women in their decision. In 
Great Britain, reparative justice would imply, firstly, legislative recognition of women as 
autonomous decision-makers, secondly, extension of abortion services and equality of 
access, and, thirdly, undermining negative depictions of women who have terminated their 
pregnancies.   
Our analysis of the limitations of the medical approach and rights-based framework 
embedded in legislation in Great Britain and in South Africa respectively illustrates the need 
to rethink abortion advocacy. If reparative justice implies, in relation to abortion, the 
material facilitation of autonomous decision-making, the provision of legal and healthcare 
resources that make abortion accessible and safe, public discourses that affirm women as 
decision-makers regarding the outcome of a pregnancy, and the provision of spaces for 
women to construct and tell their own stories of their pregnancies, then these issues need 
to be central to advocacy for reform.  
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